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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the international and Federal
efforts to enhance safety at sea and the protection of the
marine environment through the development of standards to
improve the training and strengthen the professional
qualifications of seafarers.

Special regard is made to

the International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, signed
by the United States in 1979, and to the proposed
amendments to the Federal regulations for licensing U.S.
maritime personnel which will bring the U.S. licensing
scheme in general conformance with that Convention.

This

research should lessen resistance to U.S. ratification of
this treaty, and result in a safer, less polluted marine
environment.

The views expressed in this paper are the author's.
They are not necessarily those of the U.S. Coast Guard, or
any U.S. government official, unless directly attributed
to him or her.

Errors, omissions, or misrepresentations

are totally the responsibility of the author.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

The United states has long maintained that its
standards for licensing maritime personnel are among the
highest in the world.

U.S. support for an international

convention which establishes certification standards for
mariners world-wide should logically follow.

According to

Benkert [1983J, the best way to ensure sa f.e vessel
operations and to provide proper environmental protection
is to have strong, uniform international standards
complemented where necessary by harmonious national
legislation or regulation.
Although the International Convention on Standards of
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers
(STCW) does not solve all of the problems of
certification, qualification and training of seafarers, it
is a large step forward for many nations of the world.
Although the Convention does create additional
requirements for some segments of the U.S. maritime
industry, the effect of those requirements may have been
overstated.

In any event, international efforts toward

improvement of vessel and personnel safety should preempt
the consideration of those segments of industry.

It is

hypothesized therefore that it is in the best interest of
the United states to ratify the STCW Convention.
1

Many advances have been made over the years to
improve the safety and efficiency of ships at sea.
Consider the shift from wooden hulls to iron, then steel;
the conversion from sail power to steam, then diesel; and
the move away from relatively small, sleek cargo vessels
toward the behemoths plying the seas today.

Technological

advancements in materials, equipment and design are
responsible for a great deal of this improvement, and
these developments have received attention from
governments and international agencies, especially the
International Maritime Organization (IMO).
Despite the technical improvements, marine casualties
and pollution still occur.

Safety at sea and the

protection of the marine environment ultimately rest with
the crews of ships rather than with the ships themselves.
Although various standards for training and qualification
of these seafarers were addressed by individual
governments over the years, very little discussion of
these standards and qualification standards took place in
the international arena.

The Officers' Competency

Certificates Convention, 1936, adopted under the auspices
of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and ratified
by only twenty-five nations, was the sole international
law on the subject until recently.

This Convention

prohibits any person from being engaged as master or chief
engineer of a vessel, or officer in charge of a deck or
2

engineering watch, unless the person holds a certificate
of competency (license) to perform such duties.

The

Convention does not itself prescribe qualifications for
certificates, but requires governments to prescribe
minimum ages and minimum periods of professional
experience to be completed by candidates for each grade or
certificate, and provides for administration of
examinations which must be passed before issuance of a
certificate.

Governments are also allowed to exempt

vessels under 200 gross registered tons.

The U.S.

ratified this treaty in 1938, and it provides much of the
1 egal basi s for the U. S. Coast Guard I s enforcement

activity in the personnel area [U.S. Congress, House,
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries Oversight
Report, 1978].
The International Convention for the Safety of life
at Sea (SalAS) mentions only that "all ships shall be
sufficiently and efficiently manned," though the
conference which concluded the 1960 SalAS Convention did
adopt a resolution on the Training of Masters, Officers
and Seamen in the Use of Aids to Navigation and other
devices.
IlO.

This resolution was later acted upon by IMO and

These organizations established a joint Training

Committee; this committee developed a training guide which
eventually came to cover most safety and training

3

requirements of officers and ratings aboard merchant ships
[Sadek, 1984J.
None of these measures fulfilled the need for
international standards for certification of seafarers
however.

Problems related to the quality of training of

masters and officers, as well as the minimum requirements
for these services, had for a long time been regarded as
unsuitable for regulation by way of international
agreement [Lampe, 1983J.

It was felt that few countries

would consent to relinquishing control in this matter and
little ground for consensus existed.
For many issues pertaining to safety and the
environment, consensus only develops as a result of
calamity.

In early 1970, an International Maritime

Organization working group reported:
that in view of the continuing alarming rise in
maritime casualties and pollution, it is
necessary for urgent action to be taken, aimed
at strengthening and improving standards and
professional qualifications of mariners, as a
means of securing better guarantees of safety at
sea and protection of the marine environment
[Benkert, 1978J.
This group provided the impetus for creation of the
Subcommittee on Standards of Training and Watchkeeping
within the Marine Safety Committee of IMO in 1972.
After six years of study and debate, the first major
international effort to upgrade merchant vessel crew
qualifications was undertaken at the International
Conference on Training and Certification of Seafarers held
4

at IMO headquarters in London.

At this Conference,

seventy-two nations agreed on the text of the world's
first international convention establishing basic
standards on training, certification and watchkeeping for
masters, officers and crews of "seagoing" merchant ships.
The adoption of the International Convention on the
Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers (STCW), 1978, filled what many have regarded as
the last major gap in maritime safety legislation [Sadek,
1984J.

Based on the widely accepted assumption that human

error in some manner is a contributing factor in 80-85% of
maritime accidents [White House, 1977; Sadek, 1984J, the
developed training and qualification standards, now in
force internationally, should better qualify seafarers to
avoid maritime casualties.
The United States has not yet ratified the STCW
Convention, even though it participated actively in its
drafting.

The Convention was transmitted to the U.S.

Senate by the President on August 10, 1979 with a
recommendation for prompt consideration and advice and
consent to its ratification.

The treaty was referred to

the Committee on Foreign Relations on September 5, 1979
where committee action is still pending.

To date no

hearings have been held.
Irrespective of U.S. ratification of the treaty, the
STCW Convention is of major consequence to U.S. maritime
5

personnel.

The Federal licensing system for these

seafarers is undergoing revision due in large part to the
anticipated impact of the Convention.

The Chapters which

follow analyze that impact on U.S. seafarers.
This paper argues for support of U.S. ratification of
the STCW Convention.

Examination of the major provisions

of the Convention follows a discussion of the
International Maritime Organization's efforts leading up
to agreement on the text of the Convention, and of U.S.
participation in that undertaking.

Federal rulemaking

efforts to revise the present licensing system are then
considered.
TABLE 1 contains a chronology of events which may
help the reader follow the major events which took place
throughout this period.

A list of abbreviations is

provided in TABLE 2.
APPENDIX 1 contains comparison charts of the STCW
Text with Federal regulations for those few items in which
U.S. requirements are deemed insufficient to meet
Convention provisions.
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TABLE 1

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS CONCERNING LICENSING OF
MARITIME PERSONNEL

1936 - Officers' Competency Certificates Convention
adopted
1958 - IMO enters into existence. State department
creates Shipping Coordinating Committee
1971 - IMO Marine Safety Committee establishes
Subcommittee on Standards of Training and Watchkeeping
1977 - President Carter initiates measures to reduce oil
pollution of oceans, and urges swift consideration of
international crew standards
1978 - STCW Convention adopted at IMO Conference. USCG
notifies public of intent to adopt STCW provisions in U.S.
regulations. Congress passes P.L. 95-474 PORT AND TANKER
SAFETY ACT OF 1978
1979 - STCW Convention transmitted to Senate for
consideration
1980 - Congress passes P.L. 96-378 INSPECTION AND MANNING
LAWS - SMALL VESSELS
1981 - USCG publishes Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking [CGD 81-059J "Licensing of Officers and
Motorboat Operators and Registration of Staff Officers"
1983 - All required provisions for entry into force of
STCW Convention are met. USCG publishes Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking [CGO 81-059J "Licensing of Officers
and Operators and Registration of Staff Officers"
1984 - STCW Convention enters into force.
Provisions in effect

Transitional

1985 - USCG publishes Supplemental Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking [CGO 81-059J "Licensing of Maritime Personnel"
1987 - (Predicted) USCG Interim Final Rules [CGO 81-059J
" Lice nsin g 0 f Mar i tim e Per son ne 1" promu1 gat ed
1989 - Transitional Provisions of STCW will expire.
Source:

Author
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TABLE 2

ABBREVIATIONS

AB

Able Seaman

AIMS

American Institute of Merchant Shipping

ANPRM

Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

CGD

Coast Guard Docket

FCC

Federal Communications Commission

FR

Federal Register

GT

Gross Tons

I L0

International Labor Organization

IMO

International Maritime Organization

MMD

Merchant Mariner's Document

NPRM

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

OCMI

Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection

OMSA

Offshore Marine Services Association

SHC

Shipping Coordination Committee

SOLAS

International Convention for the Safety of Life
a t Sea

STCW

International Convention on Standards of
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers, 1978

USCG

United States Coast Guard

Source:

Author
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CHAPTER TWO
THE IMO INITIATIVE

The International Maritime Organization
Conventions on shipping and other maritime matters
adopted prior to the establishment of IMO were formulated
by intergovernmental or private bodies interested in some
particular aspect of the industry [Mankabady, 1984].

Over

the years, the number of these organizations and the rules
they prescribed increased substantially.

By 1948, many

states felt that a permanent international body was needed
to coordinate existing maritime regulations, to promote
further measures, and to improve cooperation in the field
of shipping.

The International Maritime Organization was

then established in Geneva on March 6, 1948 by the
Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization, a treaty which serves as IMO's constitution
[Juda, 1977].

IMO is one of the specialized agencies of

the United Nations; it began its work in 1958 as the first
international body devoted exclusively to shipping and
other maritime matters [IMO, 1985].

IMO's Objectives
IMO's major objective is to promote cooperation among
governments on technical and related matters affecting
international shipping in order to achieve the highest
9

practicable standards of maritime safety, pollution
control and efficiency of navigation [Exxon Marine, 1978J.
It also functions as an international forum for
consideration of all matters concerning shipping and the
effect of shipping on the marine environment, and as an
information exchange among Governments on matters under
such consideration.

Finally, IMO's Secretary-General is

the depository for numerous conventions related to
shipping and maritime matters [Mankabady, 1984J.
IMO's efforts toward enhancement of safety at sea and
protection of the marine environment focus primarily on
establishing technical standards and operational
procedures for vessels.

In order to achieve its

objectives IMO has, in the last twenty-eight years,
promoted the adoption of some thirty conventions and
protocols, and adopted well over 500 codes and
recommendations concerning maritime safety, the prevention
of pollution and related matters [IMO, 1985J.
As with all treaties, IMO conventions enter into
force only after ratification by the number of states
specified in the convention.

The provisions of a

convention are binding upon countries which are party to
it.

However, the impact of IMO convention provisions and

other resolutions, recommendations and codes is often felt
beyond the borders of the Party State for two reasons.

10

First, IMO's highly respected instruments are
frequently adopted verbatim in domestic legislation.
These instruments, often technical in nature, represent a
great deal of specialized effort, some of which is neither
affordable or available to nations, especially developing
nations. IMO encourages their widespread use.
Second, many Party States' governments enforce IMO
standards against foreign vessels calling at their ports.
Prudent shipowners engaged in foreign trade are therefore
likely to build and operate their vessels according to IMO
standards, irrespective of the flag government's
acceptance of a particular convention.

The port state

control concept has the effect of curtailing operations of
many sub-standard vessels and owners.
The port state control concept has been legitimized
in many of the more recent international maritime
conventions, including the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty.
This provision was not in effect under the Officers'
Competency Certificates Convention, 1936.

As a

consequence of the failure to ratify this treaty, a
nation 's crew training and qualification standards are
open to the scrutiny of governments of the port states at
which they call.

The control provision contained in the

STCW Convention is examined in Chapter Four of this paper.

11

STCW Convention: Background
In October 1971, the Maritime Safety Committee of IMO
established the Subcommittee on Standards of Training and
Watchkeeping and charged it with responsibility of
consideration of standards of certification for seafarers.
Their objective was " ... strengthening and improving the
standards and professional qualifications of mariners as a
means of securing better guarantees of safety at sea and
protection of the marine environment" [Benkert, 1978J.
The subcommittee set to work to study the problem and
prepare a position to be considered at the Joint IMO/ILO
Committee on Training and, eventually, at the
International Conference on Training and Certification of
Seafarers, then scheduled for October 1978.

The

subcommittee met once in 1972 and twice a year thereafter
to produce a draft convention which was approved by the
IMO Marine Safety Committee for consideration by the
Conference.

The Carter Initiative
The STCW Conference held special significance for the
United States.

In the winter of 1976-77 several marine

casualties involving oil tankers in or near u.S. waters
prompted then President Jimmy Carter to address the
Congress of the United States and recommend, among other
measures, international improvement of tanker crew
12

standards and training [see note 1J.

The President

announced his intention to raise the licensing and
qualification standards for American crews, and instructed
the Secretary of Transportation to identify requirements
which should be discussed at the upcoming STCW Conference.
It was made clear that these requirements, if not included
in the conference, may be imposed unilaterally by the
United States government after 1978 on the crews of all
s hip s calli ngat Am e ric a n p 0 r t s [W hit e H0 use, 1977] .
In light of President Carter's message to Congress,
and at the request of the United States, member nations of
IMO agreed with the need to establish minimum requirements
for crew standards at the earliest possible time.

The

STCW Convention, originally planned for late in 1978, was
advanced to June of that year.

1 The most notable of these casualties was that of
the Liberian tank vessel ARGO MERCHANT, which grounded in
international waters 28 miles southeast of Nantucket
Island on December 15, 1976; the resulting oil pollution
involved all of the 204,000 barrels of heavy heating oil
which had been destined for the Boston area. Later in the
same month the Liberian tank vessel SANSINENA suffered an
explosion and fire while taking on ballast and fuel at an
oil terminal in Los Angeles Harbor. This casualty
rendered the vessel a total loss, resulted in the loss of
life by 8 persons and injury to 50 others, with
considerable damage to shoreside installations and
pollution of the harbor with fuel oil.
Source: Legislative History, P.L. 95-474: Port and Tanker
Safety Act of 1978
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The STW Conference
The International Conference on Training and
Certification of Seafarers, held during the summer of 1978
at IMO headquarters in London, was the first international
convention ever held to deal with merchant vessel crew
qualifications.

The Conference was sponsored by the

International Maritime Organization in association with
the International Labor Organization to consider the draft
International Convention on Training and Certification of
Seafarers, and related resolutions and recommendations.
The seventy-two member states' delegations and many
consultative groups from IMO were joined at the STW
Conference by observers from the United Nations, various
inter-governmental organizations, non-government
organizations and specialized agencies, including the
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), Commission
of the European Communities (EEC), International Chamber
of Shipping (ICS), International Shipping Federation
(ISF), Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF),
International Shipowners' Association (INSA), Friends of
the Earth International (FOE) and others.

The draft STCW

Convention and related items considered by the Conference
represented the culmination of six years of effort by
IMO's Subcommittee on Standards of Training and
Watchkeeping (STW).

14

CHAPTER THREE
STCW AND THE UNITED STATES

U.S. Interests in STCW
The U.S. delegation to the Conference numbered
twenty-eight members and was chaired by Rear Admiral W. M.
Benkert, who was then Chief, Office of Marine Safety,
United States Coast Guard.

He was joined at the

Conference by other government officials, and by advisors
from throughout the marine industry nominated by the
Shipping Coordinating Committee.
The Shipping Coordinating Committee, a federal
advisory committee formed by the State Department in 1958
to ensure private sector participation in the positions
developed by the United States for IMO, had been greatly
involved with the formation of the U.S. posture prior to
the STCW Conference.

Before U.S. participation in any of

the IMO Committees or Subcommittees, public meetings of
the Shipping Coordinating Committee (SHC) are normally
held to formulate the U.S. positions.

Private sector

participation in these meetings is encouraged.
Announcements of these meetings are printed in the Federal
Register in advance of the meeting date and invitations
are sent directly to interested industries, labor
organizations, government agencies and other
organizations.

The U.S. Coast Guard chairs three
15

technical Subcommittees and twelve working groups of the
SHC .
The SHC had formed a working group on Standards of
Training and Watchkeeping which met before each of the
gatherings of the IMO Subcommittee.

This group prepared

the working papers and developed the positions from which
the American delegations would negotiate with other IMO
members.

The U.S. Position
Interest in the IMO STW Subcommittee proceedings grew
as the draft Convention took shape.

The report of the

U.S. delegation to STW II in 1973 stated that:
[the] Subcommittee tracks along parallel lines
with what we are endeavoring to accomplish
nationally. U.S. Working Paper was extensively
used at the meeting. Whatever is developed
should prove beneficial to U.S. interests. Our
standards are already among the highest. Any of
our own weaknesses will be highlighted and
rectified. [Naccara, undated]
This sentiment did not endure the entire length of the
preliminary negotiations however.

The STW III report to

IMO's Marine Safety Committee stated, "In view of the
complexity of the task, the Subcommittee decided to
consider vessels of 1600 tons and over as a first step,
and then at future sessions consider vessels of less than
1600 gross tons."
At this juncture, disagreements began to arise
between the U.S. and other member delegations.
16

Negotiations concerning training and sea service
requirements for personnel operating vessels in the 200 1600 Gross Register Tonnage range were especially onerous.
The international community favored strict sea-going
service and training requirements for vessels in this
class; the United states favored more relaxed standards.
The predominant service of this size vessel are as
towing vessels and as crew and supply boats in the
offshore mineral and oil industry.

With its large,

domestic towing fleet and offshore oil industry, the U.S.
had considerable experience developing standards for
personnel operating these vessels.

It was felt that

stringent standards for this segment of the industry were
unwarranted, as it generally operated small vessels close
to shore.
Also significant, offshore oil-producing industries
were emerging in nations other than the United States at
this time, especially in the North Sea area.

With the

severe conditions encountered there, in contrast to the
moderate conditions existing in the Gulf of Mexico, more
rigorous international requirements were deemed to be
prudent.

With standards higher than those favored by the

U.S. prevailing, American operators could conceivably be
locked out of employment opportunities in foreign
locations.

17

The delegation report from STW IV expressed "second
thoughts" about the evolving international requirements
for these smaller vessels, but stated that "We believe
that the privilege of evaluating equivalent service will
always be retained by the Administrations, so the document
need not be opposed at this time."
By STW VI however, the situation had worsened.
U.S .

The

delegation reported " ... the length of qualifying sea

service for vessels in worldwide trade remains illogically
high ... the U.S. position favors a reasonable reduction of
sea time and a lesser depth of knowledge for small vessel
personnel.
matter."

Accordingly, we reserved our position on this
It appeared that, at least in this area, the

U.S. view would not prevail.
An additional problem surfaced for a different
segment of the industry.

The STW required three years of

sea-going service for entry level officers on deep sea
vessels; a substitution of a period of special training
for not more than two years of this sea-going service was
permitted.
Most nations operate apprenticeship programs aboard
ships for future officers.

The United States system of

maritime academies appears to be unique.

The one year sea

time requirement presented difficulties for the Federal
and State maritime institutions in the United States.
their four year curriculum, these schools provided only
18

~n

six to nine months of sea-going service.

Increased sea

service requirements meant revising the maritime schools'
curricula; the only options available to the institutions
appeared to be operation of existing training ships for
longer periods of time at sea, or procurement of
additional training ships.

Either option would involve

increased funding from the Federal government.

Domestic Opposition
Opposition from within the U.S. working group to U.S.
support of the draft STCW Convention was beginning to be
heard.

In a letter to the delegation chairman dated

November 30, 1977, the Executive Director of the Offshore
Marine Service Association (OMSA), an organization
representing the operators of crew and supply vessels in
the offshore oil industry, stated that: "The United States
should not support the Convention on Standards of Training
and Watchkeeping as presently drafted, for it will do
needless, irreparable harm to all U.S. Flag small tonnage
vessels" [OMSA, 1977, emphasis in original].

It was felt

that more stringent qualifications would squeeze many
existing or prospective small vessel license candidates
out of the industry and create a labor shortage in the
rapidly growing offshore oil industry.
By this stage of negotiations however, the delegation
was largely committed to the draft Convention [Mayberry,
19

in U.S. Congress, Hearings, 1980J.

The U.S. had

negotiated firmly to raise the level of the world's
standards nearer to those of the United States.
Furthermore, the initiatives by President Carter for tank
vessels had been considered and included in the draft.
The conviction of the government was that work on the
draft Convention was proceeding satisfactorily and that
U.S. requirements were largely met.

The U.S. delegation

to the STW Conference was convinced that the proposed
Convention, despite some sticking points for certain
segments of the marine industry , was the best that the
U.S. could hope to obtain [Benkert, 1978J.

They did not

anticipate, nor could they prevent, the domestic
difficulties which lay ahead.

20

CHAPTER FOUR
THE STCW CONVENTION

The Convention: Accepted
The final STCW Convention was approved by the
Conference and opened for signatures on July 7, 1978.
Article XIV of the Convention states:
The Convention shall enter into force twelve
months after the date on which not less than
twenty-five states, the combined merchant
tonnage of which constitute not less than fifty
per cent of the gross tonnage of the world's
merchant shipping of ships of 100 gross register
tons or more, have either signed it without
reservation as to ratification, acceptance or
approval or deposited the requisite instruments
of ratification, acceptance or approval or
accession in accordance with Article XIII.
On April 27, 1983, Poland became the 25th state to deposit
its acceptance of the Convention (the tonnage provision
had already been met).

STCW is presently in force

effective April 28, 1984 for party states.

A listing of

those states is provided in TABLE 3.

Major Provisions of STCW
The Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers Convention 1978 consists of the
following parts:
Part One

The Articles (17)

Part Two

The Annex (6 Chapters)

Part Three

Resolutions (23 Recommendations).
21

TABLE 3

STCW CONVENTION RATIFICATIONS AND
ACCESSIONS AS OF 31 JULY 1986

Argentina
Australia
Bahamas
Bangladesh
Belgium
Benin
Br az i 1
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Ch ina
Columbia
Cy pr us
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Egypt
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Gabon
German Democratic
Republic
Federal Republic of
Germany
Greece
Honduras
Hong Kong
Hungary
India
Ireland
Source:

Is 1e 0 f Ma n
Israel
Jap an

Democratic Republic
of Korea
Republic of Korea
Liberia
Libya
Mexico
Mozambique
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nigeria
Norway
Paki stan
Per u
Philippines
Po 1and
Portugal
South Africa
Sweden
Tanzania
Tuval u
Union of Soviet
Soci al i st Reps.
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
Yugoslavia

International Legal Materials

22

It must be recognized that the STCW Convention is not
intended as a model on which all States must necessarily
base their crew requirements, for many countries'
requirements are actually higher than those laid down in
the Convention [IMO, 1985J.

It does not attempt to lay

down the highest possible standards, but does establish
basic guidelines which can be accepted by all maritime
nations.

This may be of particular benefit to developing

nations in improving or establishing personnel standards
for their crews.

Part One - The Articles
The Convention contains seventeen articles, namely:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10 .
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

General obligations
Definitions
Application
Communication of Information
Other treaties and interpretations
Certificates
Transitional provisions
Dispensation
Equivalents
Control
Promotion of technical co-operation
Amendments
Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval
and accession
Entry into force
Denunciation
Deposit and registration
Languages

The principal provisions in the articles of the
Convention pertain to the issuance of certificates to
seafarers and to the exercise of control with respect to
such certificates on all ships when in the ports of a
23

party to the Convention [CGO 78-100

43 FR 21125].

The

Convention applies to all seafarers serving aboard seagoing ships of a Party state except:
- warships or other public vessels;
- fishing vessels;
pleasure yachts not engaged in trade; or
- wooden ships of a primitive build (dhows and
junks) .
It is noteworthy that, unlike the Officers'
Competency Certificates Convention, 1936 and many other
international conventions, there is no vessel exempt from
STCW provisions based solely upon size.
The control provision is contained in Article X.
Control by port offices is limited to:
- verifying that all seafarers serving on board who
are required to be certificated by the Convention
are so certificated or hold an appropriate
dispensation, and
- assessing the ability of seafarers to maintain the
required watchkeeping

st~ndards

if believing that

such standards are not being maintained
[Sadek, 1984].
Furthermore, Regulation 1/4 contained in the Annex to
the Convention (Part II) specifies the grounds upon which
the port authorities will suspect that the standards are
not maintained.

These are:
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(1)

The ship has been involved in a collision,
grounding or stranding.

(2)

There has been a discharge of substances from
the ship when underway, at anchor or at berth
which is illegal under international
conventions.

(3)

The ship has been maneuvered in an erratic or
unsafe manner or navigational course markers or
traffic separation schemes have not been
followed.

These provisions require informing the master of the
ship and consul of the Flag state in writing on any
deficiency found and the reasons why these pose a danger
to persons, property or the environment.
According to the Convention, the control article is
to be applied as may be necessary to ensure " ... no more
favorable treatment is given to ships entitled to fly the
flag of a non-Party than is given to ships entitled to fly
the flag of a Party."

How this will actually be

accomplished is not yet known.
Also of note in Part One is Equivalency Article
(Article IX).

This section gives considerable latitude to

Administrations to determine substitutes for STCW
provisions, if available, so long as the equivalent it
uses insures a comparable degree of safety at sea and
pollution prevention.

The details of such arrangements
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are required to be reported to the Secretary-General of
IMO, who is to circulate them to all parties to the
Convention.

Part Two - The Annex
STCW imposes mandatory minimum standards for crew
qualifications where few or none previously existed.
These provisions are set out in the Annex of the
Convention and must be certified as having been met by the
vessel's flag state.
The six chapters to the annex are:
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter

1
2
3
4
5
6

General Provisions
Master - Deck Department
Engine Department
Radio Department
Special requirements for tankers
Proficiency in survival craft.

The Annex to the Convention contains the regulations
concerning the physical fitness, training, sea service and
professional examination of seafarers, and includes
specific watchkeeping regulations for navigational (deck),
engineering and radio officers at sea and in port.

These

very complete listings of basic principles for sound
watchkeeping had never before been set out and agreed upon
in any international forum.
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Part Three - The Resolutions
The Conference also adopted 23 resolutions which
reinforce the Convention by recommending additional
procedures and inviting further development of appropriate
training requirements by the organization [Benkert, 1978J.
In general, these resolutions deal with operational
guidance for deck, engine or radio officers or training
recommendations for special ships such as liquified gas
carriers and chemical and oil tankers.

These resolutions

should assist national authorities and the training
institutes in Party states to prepare training programs
for the crews of such ships [Sadek, 1984J.
In addition to setting out provisions necessary for
certification of seafarers and the watchkeeping
regulations, the STCW Convention provides for technical
cooperation among Governments.

Each Party is encouraged

to promote support for those Parties which request
technical assistance for training of administrative and
technical personnel, establishment of seafarers' training
institutions, provision of training facilities and
supplies, and program development.

For its part, IMO

pursues the same objectives in consultation or association
with other international organizations, particularly the
ILO.
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STCW and U.S. Regulations: A Comparison
The major differences between STCW and the U.S.
licensing scheme for unlimited licenses (deep draft
vessels) include the following:
(1) The gross tonnage base for qualification for an
unlimited deck officer's license is 1,600 gross
tons under STCW as compared with 1,000 gross tons
in the U.S.

This tonnage break at 1600 tons

reflects the increased size of today's oceangoing
ships.
(2) Any applicant for original, upgrade or renewal of
license will have to satisfy the administration
as to his/her medical fitness, particularly
regarding eyesight and hearing.

Present

regulations for these license actions are only
specific in certain areas.
(3) Each license applicant will have to show evidence
of completion of an approved fire fighting
course.

No U.S requirement now exists except for

endorsement as Tankerman.
(4) Special training for certain officers and
unlicensed crew members serving on oil, chemical
or liquified gas carriers will be required.

Only

tankerman requirements now exist.
(5) For an original license as officer in charge of, a
navigational watch (mate) on ships of 200 gross
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tons or more, a full year of sea service would be
required for graduates of the Federal Maritime
Academy and state Maritime Academies.

These

graduates receive a lesser amount of total sea
service in their programs at present.
Standards for smaller vessels (less than 1600 GT) do
require strengthening to bring them in line with STCW.

By

taking advantage of available equivalencies, and assuming
completion of an approved training course, in most
instances additional requirements are not excessive.
However, increased sea service is obligated for some
licenses, especially Master of vessels of 200 - 1600 GT
and Chief Engineer of vessels of vessels between 750 kW
and 3000 kW, and these are detailed on the Comparison
Charts in APPENDIX 1.
Comparison charts of text developed by the
International Conference on Training and Certification of
Seafarers, 1978 with present U.S. licensing and
certification requirements are especially helpful in
attempting to understand the hesitation of certain U.S.
interests in embracing the convention.

Since an article

by article presentation would be too lengthy, only those
items where the U.S. standards do not meet international
requirements are listed.

The charts are arranged by

pertinent article or regulation of the Convention with the
applicable U.S. regulation displayed alongside. The
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differences between the two are pointed out in the final
columns.
TABLE 4 contains a listing, arranged by license
category and qualification requirement, of the applicable
U.S. regulation governing a particular item found in the
charts should the reader wish to cross-reference the STCW
article directly to the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations.
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CHAPTER FIVE
WHAT TO DO ABOUT STew

Why not ratify?
There are practical and philosophical arguments made
against U.S. ratification of the STeW convention .

The

practical arguments will be considered first.
As stated previously, the standards and requirements
contained in STeW are generally equal to or less stringent
than those required by U.S. law.

In two specific

instances however, this is not the case.

Sea service and

training requirements under STeW for officers on vessels
of 200-1600 gross tons in ocean or near coastal waters are
more stringent than existing U.S. regulations.

Vessels in

this category are predominately found in the offshore
towing industry and the offshore mineral and oil industry
(crew and supply boats).
Furthermore, the sea service requirement for certain
entry-level officers aboard deep-sea vessels is more
stringent than present U.S. regulations.

Strict adherence

to STeW regulations would necessitate increased federal
support to the Federal and State sponsored maritime
schools (the usual source of these entry-level personnel)
for additional operation of their training vessels.
Additionally, several requirements exist which would
increase physical examination and training requirements
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for original applicants and physical examination
requirements for renewing applicants.

This will result in

increased costs for maritime companies as they often
provide the instruction for their employees which enables
them to comply with various license requirements.
Though steps to overcome part of these problems have
been taken through amendments to the existing Federal
licensing regulations, consideration of the STCW treaty
remains effectively blocked by legislators with
constituencies in the affected groups.

These groups

believe that the Convention sets too stringent standards
for their segment of the industry.
Ironically, the philosophical argument against
ratification of the convention takes the opposite view.
This position maintains that it is essential that IMO
establish rigorous standards of training and certification
of seafarers in order to limit the possibility of a
serious marine casualty resulting from incompetent or illtrained personnel [Exxon Marine, 1978J.

It has been

suggested that stringent international standards will not
only raise the safety level of maritime operations around
the world, but will also make ship operations more costly
for the countries which once had lower standards.

This

increase will put those nations on a more equal footing
with countries who maintained high standards (especially
the United states) and assist the U.S.-flag fleet to
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compete with other flags for world trade.

Proponents of

this position oppose the STCW Convention because it does
not set sufficiently rigorous standards.

u.s.

Options

There are five options which have been considered for
the U.S. concerning the STCW Convention.
1.

Do nothing.

The first, and least desireable, option is to do nothing.
This may subject U.S. Merchant Mariners to loss of
employment opportunities, and U.S. vessels to risk of
delay or detention in foreign ports or other restrictions
in international trade.

The failure to certify the

officers or crew as being in compliance with the
international prescribed standards of training and
qualification whenever possible would be irresponsible on
the part of the U.S. government, whether a Party to the
treaty or not. Despite some accounts to the contrary
[Hogan, 1983J, the U.S. government has not abandoned its
efforts to ratify the treaty. The choice of this option
over the long term is considered unlikely.

2.

Amend the Convention.

The potential exists to modify provisions of the treaty
found objectionable to certain U.S. interests through the
amendment process specified in Article XII.
36

The

likelihood of success of such a venture is extremely
doubtful however.

After nearly eight years in

preparation, six years to entry into force and three years
in force, few nations will be willing to reopen arguments
which have been laid to rest long ago.

Furthermore, an

amendment process has the potential to undo the positive
achievements of the Convention.

3.

Ratify with Reservations.

One suggestion on handling the objectionable portions of
the STCW Convention, namely the required service
provisions of Regulation 11/2-4 and Regulation 111/3-2, is
to reserve to those provisions.

Since the Convention does

not contain a "reservations" article, the customary
principle applies.

This principle, restated in Article 19

of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is: "A
state may, when ... ratifying ... a treaty, formulate a
reservation unless ... the reservation is incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty."
The proposed reservations do not seem to be
compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

The

purpose of the treaty is to upgrade and harmonize
worldwide standards of training, certification and
watchkeeping for seafarers, in order to promote safety of
life and property at sea and the protection of the marine
environment.
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In Article I, the Parties undertake to give the
Convention full and complete effect so as to ensure that
seafarers on board ships are qualified and fit for their
duties.

There are transitional and dispensation

provisions to protect presently certificated personnel
(Articles VII and VIII) .

And there is an "equivalents"

article which provides the specific basis upon which
parties may reduce the sea service requirements of the
Convention by allowing equivalents for sea service time
(Article IX).

Further, the regulations contain express

limitations on the maximum amount of reduction by
eq u i val en t s .

For e xam p1e , Reg u1at ion I I /2- 4 ( b) ( i i )

requires 36 months seagoing service, which may be reduced
"to not less than 24 months" with special training.
The scheme for sea-going service set forth by the
Convention is evident.

Specific times are required and

where those times may be var ied, the Convention states how
the variance may be accomplished.

With such detailed

provisions and specified relief procedures, reservations
to the sea-going service requirements would likely be
viewed as operating to frustrate the object and purpose of
the treaty [DeWolf, 1981].

4.

Determine an Equivalency.

The United States may attempt to determine an equivalency
allowed by STCW whenever possible.
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Article IX of the

Convention grants considerable latitude to Administrations
to retain or adopt other educational and training
arrangements, including those involving sea-going service,
provided that " ... the level of sea-going service,
knowledge and efficiency as regards navigational and
technical handling of ship and cargo ensures a degree of
safety at sea and has a preventative effect as regards
pollution at least equivalent to the requirements of the
Convention."

This option has been utilized extensively,

where allowed by the Convention, in preparing the proposed
amendments to the federal licensing scheme.

5.

Ratify the Convention.

Since the U.S. largely meets or exceeds the minimum
standards established by STCW, the potential benefits of
STCW, namely enhancement of safety at sea and protection
of the marine environment, far outweigh any disadvantages.
The Convention represents a great leap forward for many
states and generally raises standards and qualifications
of seafarers worldwide.

Therefore, ratification of the

Convention is the most desireable option.

Ratification is

the objective which the Coast Guard has pursued since 1978
through its efforts to revise the existing Federal
licensing system discussed in the following Chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE STRUGGLE FOR FEDERAL POLICY

Introduction
In October of 1981 the U.S. Coast Guard gave public
notice of a planned major overhaul of those federal
regulations concerned with the licensing of maritime
personnel.

This overhaul was undertaken to "reduce the

number of specialized deck licenses, simplify
administration, improve readability to aid public
understanding of the licensing regulations and clearly
define paths of progression for a mariner."
The justification given for this overhaul, in
addition to streaml ining the administration of the
licensing system, was to allow the Coast Guard to
implement provisions of recently enacted legislation which
affected federal maritime personnel policy, specifically
Public Law 96-378: Inspection and Manning Laws - Small
Vessels, and Public Law 95-474: The Port and Tanker Safety
Act of 1978.

Underlying these stated purposes, however,

wa s the Co as t Gua r d's des i r e to f 0 s t e r sup portf 0 r U. S.
ratification of the recently adopted International
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, (STCW), 1978.

The United

States, especially the Coast Guard, had actively
participated in the drafting of the Convention, and
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continues to participate in the interpretation of its
provi sions.
Resistance to the Coast Guard's rulemaking effort was
stiff; but some of the opposition to the STCW Convention
is believed to be based upon misconceptions and
misperceptions about Coast Guard regulatory intent
[Proceedings, 1985].

Since the requirements under the

STCW Convention are viewed by many as weaker than the
requirements maintained by the United States, any revision
to the U.S. system is perceived as a weakening of that
system as well.

Federal Involvement in Licensing of Seafarers
Many of the laws dealing with inspection and manning
of vessels had their origins in the 18th and 19th
centuries and were designed to apply to a marine
transportation industry centered around the development
and use of steam-driven propulsion plants for vessels.
Steam vessels encountered a steady string of disasters
resulting from explosions during the early 1800s.

The

early maritime safety laws were a legislative response
designed to provide for the protection and welfare of
steamship passengers.
During the 1830s, a series of disastrous explosions
aboard the HELEN McGREGOR, CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL,
MOSELLE, ORONOKO, and PULASKI provided the impetus for the
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Act of 1838 (46 U. S. C. 404), whie h for the fir s t tim e
required engineers aboard steam vessel s and the periodic
inspection of their hulls, boilers and machinery.

In

Apr il, 1865, an explosion aboard the vessel SULTANA, that
claimed hundreds of lives, made it evident that further
legislation was needed.

The Act of 1871, (46 U.S.C. 404),

provided for centralization of authority of the Federal
inspection service.

That authority issued regulations and

a broadens examining and licensing requirements for
officers.

Even today, the Act of 1871 constitutes the

basis of our maritime law with respect to vessel safety.
The genesis of many of our marine safety laws, then, lies
in the transition from sail vessels to steam-propelled
vessels and the instability of steam boilers

[Legislative

History, P.L. 96-378].

The Regulatory Scheme
Obviously, the marine industry has changed
considerably in the more than 100 years since the Act of
1871 was passed.

Steam propulsion is rarely used now,

even in the largest vessels, and has not been used in
smaller vessels for decades.

Developed more than a

century ago, these laws often do not meet the needs of
waterborne commerce today.

The result is that a large

segment of our merchant marine must attempt to engage in
commerce under the burden of statutes and regulations that
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are outdated, inconsistent with specialized operations,
and unduly complex [Legislative History, P.L. 96-378J.
Furthermore, the statutory distinction between inspected
vessels (formerly only large, or steam-propelled) and
uninspected vessels (formerly only small, motor driven
craft) had been clouded by technological change and common
usage.
The Commandant of the Coast Guard acknowledges that
the regulations for licensing of merchant marine officers,
based upon extant Maritime Safety statutes, has not kept
pace with technological developments and socio-economic
changes [Hayes, 1979J.

Instead, in response to industry

needs, and Congressional dictates, a vast array of
licenses was added over the years, with myriad
requirements for operators of vessels on particular routes
or in special trades and employments.

This "piecemeal"

licensing system, even without route, trade or employment
restrictions, is

evid~nt

in TABLE 5.

In its Supplemental

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Licensing of Maritime
Personnel, the Coast Guard admitted that " ... the present
list of licenses (over 100) and examinations (over 80)
create a confusing structure in which to plan a career"
[CGO 81-059

50 FR 43316J.
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TABLE 5

LICENSE GROUPS AND GRADES

GROUP A. Deck Officer Licenses
License

Waters

Vessel

Master
Master
Master
Master
Master
Master
Master
Master
Master
Master
Master
Master

Ocean
Ocean
Oc ean
Oc ean
Coastwi se
Coastwise
Coastwise
Coastwise
Great Lakes
Great Lakes
Great Lakes
Bay s , sounds
and lakes
Bay s , sounds
and 1a ke s
Bay s , sounds
and 1ak e s
Rivers
Rivers
Rivers
Inland waters
Lo cal routes

Steam or motor vessels
Sa i 1 Vessels
Uninspected Vessels *
Yachts
Steam or motor vessels
Sai 1 vessels
Yachts
Nondescript
Steam or motor vessels
Ferry Vessels
Yachts
Steam or motor vessels

Master
Master
Master
Master
Master
Master
Master
Chief Ma te
Ch i e f Ma te
Chief Ma te
Secon d Mate
Second Ma te
Th i rd Mate
Third Mate
Mate
Mate
Ma te
Ma te
Mate
Mate
First Class
Pi 1ot

Ocean
Ocean
Coastwise
Ocean
Coastwise
Ocean
Coastwise
Ocean
Coastwise
Great Lakes
Bay s , sounds
and 1a ke s
Rivers
Lo cal waters
Great Lakes

*

Ferry vessels
Yachts
Steam or motor vessels
Ferry vessels
Yachts
Pi 1ot vessels
Puerto Rican or Hawaiian
vessels
Steam or motor vessels
Sai 1 vessels
Steam or motor vessels
Steam or motor vessels
Steam or motor vessels
Steam or motor vessel s
Steam or motor vessel s
Uninspected vessel s *
Uninspected vessels
Steam or motor vessels
Steam or motor vessels
Steam or motor vessels
Puerto Rican or Hawaiian
vessels
st earn or motor vessels

These licenses may be further restricted by type of
service
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TABLE 5

LICENSE GROUPS AND GRADES (CONTINUED)

GROUP A. Deck Officer Licenses (continued)
License

Waters

Vessel

First C1ass
Pi 1ot
First Class
Pilot

Bay s , sounds
and lakes
Rivers

Steam or motor vessels
Steam or motor vessels

GROUP B. Engineer Officer Licenses
Licenses

Vessel

Chief Engineer
Chief Engineer
First Ass't Engineer
Second Ass't Engineer
Third Ass't Engineer
Assistant Engineer
Engineer of motor vessel
operating exclusively in
Puerto Rican or Hawaiian
waters

Steam and/or motor vessels
Uninspected motor vessels *
Steam and/or motor vessels
Steam and/or motor vessels
Steam and/or motor vessels
Uninspected motor vessels *
Motor vessels

GROUP C.

Radio Officer License

GR0UPD.

Sm all Pas sen ge r Ve sse lOp era tor Lice ns eLi cens e s

1. Ocean Operator
2. Operator on other than ocean and coastwise waters
3. Operator of Uninspected Passenger Vessels
(carrying six or less passengers for hire, exMotorboat Operator) upon oceans, or waters other than
ocean or coastwise
GROUP E.

Uninspected Towing Vessels

1. Operator (route(s) specified)
2. Second Class Operator (route(s) specified)

*

These 1 icenses may be further restricted by type of
service
Source:

U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Manual
45

Administration v. Standards -

An Important Distinction

Distinction must be made between the administration
of the maritime licensing system and the standards it
fosters.

Many U.S . interests felt that even among

developed maritime nations, the standards to which the
existing U.S. structure held American seafarers were among
the highest in the world [OMSA, 21 January 1982J;
consequently, they regarded U.S. Merchant Mariners as the
best qualified and highly trained seafarers to be found.
These high standards are not maintained without cost
however; some interests believed that the licensing
structure served to the disadvantage of the United States
in the international marketplace.

U.S .-flag vessel

operators incur considerable expense to employ highly
trained American mariners, as they are compelled by law to
do.

Though training is only one part of these higher

costs, it is believed to be a significant part [OMSA, 11
October 1983J.
Economic arguments notwithstanding, the system was
perceived as cumbersome and outdated, and in need of
overhaul.

The impetus for that overhaul was provided by

the International Conference on Training and Certification
of Seafarers, 1978.
The U.S. delegation to the Conference prevailed with
most of the positions developed during preliminary STW
meetings.

In his report, the Delegation Chairman stated
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that he felt that the text of the Convention was
satisfactory and accomplished what the U.S. had hoped to
achieve as a minimum standard that would be acceptable
internationally.

He further recommended that the adopted

text be strongly supported for acceptance and ratification
at the earliest possible date.
The Convention was signed by the United States and
transmitted to the Senate by President Carter on August
10, 1979 with a recommendation for prompt consideration
and advice and consent to its ratification.

It was

referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on
September 5, 1979, where further consideration has
effectively been blocked by Gulf States' legislators
concerned with its effect on licensed mariners in their
jurisdictions [Pell, 1987].

Their opposition leaves the

United States outside of the provisions of the Convention,
with ramifications for both U.S. seafarers and
international maritime cooperation.

The Federal Rulemaking Effort
Safety at sea and the protection of the marine
environment ultimately rests with qualified, well trained
vessel operators.

As the primary federal agency involved

with maritime safety and marine environmental protection
in the United States, the U.S. Coast Guard strongly
supported ratification of the STCW Convention.
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Through the Federal Register the agency apprised the
public of the main provisions of the Convention a few
weeks after its adoption at the 1978 Conference.

The

Coast Guard advised the public of its intention to pUblish
proposed rules for implementation of specific provisions
of the Convention, as well as the desirable portions of
the resolutions adopted by the Conference, which would
call for higher standards than were then required by U.S.
rules and regulations for licensing of merchant marine
personnel [CGO 78-100

43 FR 21125J.

Those rules first

appeared in the Federal Register as an Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on October 29, 1981.
Surprisingly, the ANPRM made no mention of the
provisions of the STCW Convention, though those provisions
clearly had been considered.

The reasons given for the

proposed rules were simplifying, streamlining and
improving the readability of the existing system.

With

the Convention stalled in the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, and its entry into force internationally
believed to be far off, it was apparently considered
prudent not to attempt to confuse the two separate issues,
however closely related, of treaty ratification and
regulatory revision.
The following simplifications are examples of those
proposed in the ANPRM:
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(1)

Reduction of the number of professional
examinations which would be required for a
mariner of a deep sea vessel proceeding in
his/her career from the entry level (Third Mate
or Third Assistant Engineer) to Master or Chief
Engineer from four to two. (The proposed
requirement was identical to the requirements
contained in the STCW Convention);

(2)

Elimination of most trade restrictions on
licenses (not called for in STCW);

(3)

Standardization of gross tonnage limitations
(again, identical to those found in STCW);

(4)

Endorsement of radar and ship's bridge simulator
training as a supplement for required training
for original and raise in grade of a license
(recommended in resolutions of Convention);

(5)

Elimination of the celestial navigation testing
requirement (not called for in STCW).

It is not suggested that these or the other changes
are not warranted.

Some are mandated by P.L. 96-378 which

requires, in part, that the Coast Guard establish career
patterns "appropriate to the particular service or
industry in which the officers are engaged" [CGO 81-059
46 FR 53624J.

The seventy-five written comments received

to the docket from various marine interests were generally
supportive of the proposed action.
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The simplification of

the licensing structure, especially elimination of trade
restrictions was advocated by most.

However, some viewed

the simplification process as a departure from the high
standards for which the U.S. licensing system had been
known.

This departure was perceived as weakening the

existing system and was largely attributed to the
consideration of the STCW Convention.
In 1982, the Shipping Coordinating Committee
solicited input concerning the STCW Convention.

The input

received, especially from operators of vessels of 200-1600
GRT, was in strong opposition to ratification of the
Convention.

Concern was al so expressed that the Coast

Guard was overstepping its authority by attempting to
implement provisions of the STCW Convention, which the
U.S. did not appear likely to accept in the near future,
in its proposed rulemaking effort ,[propeller Club, 1982J.

The Proposed Rules
Following consideration of this input, the next step
in the rulemaking process was taken two years later.

A

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) titled "Licensing of
Officers and Operators and Registration of Staff Officers"
was published in the Federal Register on August 8, 1983.
These rules, promulgated with the awareness that the
Convention would soon be entering force internationally,
attempted to minimize Convention impact upon U.S.
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seafarers.

Part of the intent of the rulemaking was to

harmonize U.S. regulations within the constraints of the
STCW Convention.

Specific provisions of the

simplifications broached in the advance notice were
incorporated in the proposed rules.

The use of most of

the equivalent articles available to administrations by
the Convention were placed in these proposed rules .
The STCW Convention specifically allows
administrations discretionary latitude for reduced
requirements on certain ships engaged on "near coastal
voyages" and for all ships of less than 200 gross tons.
The Convention allows each administration to define their
own "near coastal voyage" description.

Use of this

latitude, it was hoped, would resolve the sea-going
service discrepancy between the Convention and the
regulations for operators of 200-1600 GRT vessels.

U.S .

operators could be certified under the Convention without
adherence to its stringent service requirement by limiting
those licenses to "near coastal routes."

Mariners could

operate vessels off the shores of the United States
without the lengthy service required by STCW, but under
relaxed domestic requirements.

Limitations imposed on the

license could be removed if sea service to meet the
international standard was gained operating the vessel.
The near coastal route was defined as within 200 nautical
miles of shore.
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Though no public meetings were scheduled concerning
these proposed rules, comments were solicited.

Six

hundred ninety-three written comments to the docket were
eventually received, and criticism of the proposed rules
was widespread.

The Coast Guard subsequently held

nineteen public meetings, and answered thousands of
telephone inquiries about the project.

The overwhelming

reaction contained in public meetings and in the comments
to the docket was strongly against the STCW imposed
service requirements and many other more subtle changes to
the U.S. licensing regulations.
Unfortunately, the Coast Guard concluded, the
rejection of STCW was often based on misconceptions or
misperceptions of their regulatory intent [CGD 81-059
50 FR 43316J.

Many comments expressed concern that many

of the proposed changes would weaken the standards
maintained in U.S. licensing system.
use of

~

Others opposed the

STCW requirements in the U.S. licensing system.

These interests felt that a convention which is not
ratified by the United States should not have any impact
on the established 1 icensing system.

The Coast Guard

attempted to answer these comments and address some of
this opposition in the Supplemental Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, titled Licensing of Maritime Personnel.
In this supplemental notice, the Coast Guard
announced many modifications to the original proposal, and
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proposed reinstatement of some of the provisions of the
existing system which had been eliminated.

These

included, for example:
(1)

Addition of another professional examination at
the Master and Chief Engineer level;

(2)

Establishment of an additional license category
for deck licenses at 500 gross tons;

(3)

Retention of the celestial navigation portion of
all deck officer examinations.

Many of the comments concerning the effects of the
STCW Convention in the regulations were specifically
addressed in the supplemental notice.

The Coast Guard

reaffirmed its support of the Convention and expressed the
hope that, with the newly proposed solutions, discussions
in Congress and expedient ratification of the convention
might be forthcoming [Kime, 1985J.

Another comment period

was opened and five additional public meetings were
scheduled.

Summary
Twenty months have passed since the Supplemental
Notice was published.

After holding twenty-five public

meetings around the country and reviewing a cumulative
total of over 1300 written comments to the docket, Interim
final rules are in preparation at Coast Guard
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Headquarters.

Publication is expected in July, 1987.

Some comments about the rulemaking effort are in order.
First, the Coast Guard did not provide the public an
adequate explanation of the Convention's impact on U.S.
mariners proceeding to ports of Party States.

Though the

Convention's impact is not completely known, whatever
information was available should have been conveyed.
Irrespective of United States ratification of the
Convention, changes in the U.S. regulatory system for
seafarers engaged in foreign trade are necessary if U.S.
mariners are to avoid difficulties in party State ports.
If the structure and basic qualifications of licenses
issued by the Coast Guard are in general conformance to
the STCW Convention, then it will facilitate their
acceptance by the countries which are Party to it.

This

is first clearly elucidated in the Background Information
in the (draft) Interim Final Rule due for publication
soon.
Second, a discussion of the STCW Convention should
have been made in the 1981 ANPRM.

In 1978, the public had

been informed that proposed rules, based on provisions of
STCW, would be forthcoming.

When the proposal was finally

issued, U.S. consideration of the STCW treaty was stalled
in the Senate and its entry into force internationally was
not yet assured.

Out of the context of anticipated

Convention impact, the Coast Guard proposal does appear to
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be a weakening of the standards of the existing licensing
system.

For the deep ocean segment of the industry, some

requirements were significantly relaxed.

Maritime

personnel were particularly disturbed by the reduction in
the number of professional examinations required for
advancement.
Finally, the Coast Guard may have misjudged the
public perception of the existing U.S. licensing
structure.

Though Congress recognized the need for

overhaul when it passed P.L. 96-378 and the Port and
Tanker Safety Act of 1978, apparently many of those with a
vested interest in the system (i .e. present license
holders and their employers) did not.

The esteem in which

the existing system was held was either underestimated or
not sufficiently addressed in the proposal.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The International Convention on Standards of
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers,
1978 must stand as one of IMO's boldest accomplishments.
Though the Convention does not attempt to lay down the
highest possible standards, it does establish specific
basic qualifications which can be accepted and enforced by
all nations.

With these improved standards generally

accepted and implemented, fewer vessel casualty incidents
are expected in the future.
The STCW Convention does create additional
requirements for certain segments of the U.S. marine
industry. The two major difficulties posed by the
Convention, for U.S. interests, are increased sea-service
and training requirements for domestic offshore oil
industry personnel, which could possibly result in a
shortage of qualified personnel to work in this industry,
and increased sea-service requirements for Federal and
State Maritime Academy graduates.

However, resolution of

these difficulties is possible.
The offshore oil industry is no longer faced with a
manpower shortage.

The concern that adoption of increased

sea service requirements of STCW would cause a severe
shortage of manpower was expressed when the offshore oil
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industry was undergoing rapid expansion in the late 1970s.
This concern has been eroded through the general worldwide slowdown in the oil industry.

A glut of offshore

workers now exists in the Gulf states.

The least

qualified mariners have been forced to seek other
employment.

With those remaining likely to be the best

qualified, (i.e. those with the greatest length of sea
service), this argument disappears.
The problem of Federal and state Maritime Academy
graduates receiving insufficient sea service in their
course of study for certification under STew can also be
solved.

If Maritime Academies' curricula can not be

revised to accommodate the international requirements, and
use of small vessel training or bridge simulator training
can not make up any shortfall, then additional sea time
must be gained prior to certification.

Following

graduation from these schools, Merchant officer candidates
could sail on u.s. vessels as cadets, or trainees, while
holding a provisional license, until the requisite sea
time for qualification as a third mate or third assistant
engineer is acquired.

U.S. shipping companies would not

be expected to pay them as licensed members of the crew,
but they could perform shipboard duties and draw pay
commensurate with those duties until their license became
effective.

Though a departure from previous practice,

this would not be unfair for those graduates.
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A

significant portion of their training and education
expenses are borne by the Federal government; this seaservice obligation is not excessive.

The advantages of

U.S. participation in a international scheme intended to
enhance safety at sea and the protection of the marine
environment justify this action.
The consequences for non-Party States of remaining
outside of the Convention remain to be seen.

The

Transitional Provisions of the treaty provide for
acceptance of certificates issued by national certifying
administrations for five years from the treaty's entry
into force.

The United States has until April of 1989 to

join the other major maritime nations in this treaty
before its provisions can detrimentally affect U.S.
maritime personnel.

Now is the time to press for U.S.

ratification of the treaty.
The U.S. largely meets or exceeds the minimum
standards established by STCW even without a revision to
the existing regulations.

The Interim Final Rules, which

will update and revise U.S. merchant crew certification
standards and bring them in line with STCW, are nearing
completion and should be published soon.

These Rules

should help to overcome most remaining objections to
ratification.
Since the international community has finally

agre~d

upon uniform standards for certification of seafarers,
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U.S. concern for world-wide improvement of vessel and
personnel safety should override the consideration of
maritime groups' interests.

As originally hypothesized,

the United states should ratify the STCW Convention
because it is in the national interest.

The best way to

ensure safe vessel operations and to provide proper
environmental protection is to have strong, uniform
international standards, complemented where necessary by
harmonious national legislation or regulation.

The

licensing system proposed in the Interim Final Rule
maintains the high standards and recognition which the
U.S. system has developed over many years.

Conformity to

internationally developed standards will promote continued
recognition of the quality of U.S. licenses.
U.S . standards for seafarers are among the highest in
the world, and the safety record of the U.S. marine
industry is good, but these high standards should be
improved upon wherever possible.

In instances where

international standards are set higher than those of the
United States, the Administration or Congress must act to
bring U.S. requirements in line if leadership in the area
of marit ime safety is to be maintained.
Although sometimes viewed as one entity, the marine
industry in the United states does not share common goals.
The interests of one segment of the industry often counter
another.

Federal initiatives, such as those put forth by
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the Carter administration in 1977, favor one segment of
the industry at the expense of another.

Although this is

a proper role of the Federal government, the political
backlash may be severe.

This backlash makes any broad

regulatory reform difficult, and further complicates
national maritime policy.
Finally, the U.S. marine industry as well as the
government must consider the global implications of
domestic maritime positions and policies.

Many issues,

especially those related to marine safety and protection
of the ocean environment, are best resolved through
international cooperation and compromise.
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APPENDIX 1

Comparison Charts
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APPENDIX 1 Comparison between STCW and Existing U.S. Licensing Requirements
SUBJECT

STCW TEXT

EXISTING U.S. REG.

U. S. DEFICIENCY

Article VIII

Will allow manning
waivers in cases of
exceptional necessity
where there is no
danger to persons,
property or the
env i ronmen t.

Manning waivers are
granted only in the
interests of national
defense.

Would require change
to 46 CFR 2.45-1 if
U.S. decides to allow
such manning waivers
on U.S. merchant
vessels.

The definition for
propulsion power on an
engineer's license
will be stated in
" ki 1 owa t t s .

The definition for
propulsion power on an
engineer's license is
presently stated in
"horsepower."

U.S. could comment in
acceptance letter to
IMO that present
horsepower rating
system will be
retained.

Dispensation

0'1
N

Regulation III
Definitions

II

APPENDIX 1

Comparison between STCW and Existing U.S. Licensing Requirements (continued)

SUBJECT

STCW TEXT

EXISTING U.S. REG.

U.S. DEFICIENCY

Re g u1 at ion 1112

Must be physically fit
and pass eye and
hearing tests.

Must be generally
physically fit (OCMI
discretion) and pass
color sense test only.

Would require physical
exam, including visual
and hearing test.
Present U.S. law only
requires color sense
test. 46 USC 225, 226
and 228.

Re qui reme nt s
for Master and
Chief Mate
Master and
Chief Mate
Vessels 1600 GT
and over
0'1
W

Master and
Chief Mate
Vessels between
200 - 1600 GT

APPENDIX 1

Comparison between STCW and Existing U.S. Licensing Requirements (continued)

0'>

U.S. DEFICIENCY

1. Must attend firefighting course
approved by
Administration.

Deck officers must
pass written exam on
fire-fighting
eq ui pm en t ,

Completion of firefighting course
presently proposed by
U.S. regulations for
"tankerman"
endorsement to 1 icense
only. STCW would
require all 1 icensed
officers to attend
such course for this
license.

2. Must demonstrate
proficiency in
launching and handling
of lifeboats and other
lifesaving appliances
including the donning
of life-jackets

Practical demonstration presently
required only for LIB
and AB endorsements on
MMD. Deck officers
must pass written exam
on lifesaving
apparatus.

Would require all deck
officers to pass
practical
demonstration on
launching and handling
of lifeboats and other
1 ifesaving appl iances
for this license.

3. Must have thorough
knowledge of international or equivalent
national medi cal
guides.

Presently examined on
basic first aid.

Will require expanding
exam on first aid to
cover STCW
requirement.

STCW TEXT

Regulation II/2
(cont.)

Professional Knowledge

Requirements
for Master and
Chief Mate

+:0

EXISTING U.S. REG.

SUBJECT

Master and
Chief Mate
Vessels 1600 GT
and over
Master and
Chief Mate
Vessels between
200 - 1600 GT

APPENDIX 1

Comparison between STCW and Existing U.S. Licensing Requirements (continued)

SUBJECT

STCW TEXT

EXISTING U.S. REG.

U.S. DEFICIENCY

Regulation III2
(cont.)
Master of
Vessels between
200 - 1600 GT

Must have not less
than 36 months
approved service as
officer in charge of a
watch or 24 months
service if 12 months
has been served as
Chief Mate or if
special training has
bee n com p1e ted.

Generally for 1000 and
under GT the present
requirement is for 12
months of service as
officer in charge of a
deck watch.

Would require 1 year
and possibly 2 years
additional
watchstanding time to
qualify for this
license.

Chief Mate of
Vessels between
200 - 1600 GT

Must meet sea service
requirements for
officer in charge of a
navigational watch.

Generally for vessels
of 1000 GT and under,
there are no Chief
Mates, only Master and
Mate.

Would possibly require
new license structure
to comply with this
proposal; however sea
service is the same as
presently required for
U. S. Mate (3 years).

o(J1

APPENDIX 1

Comparison between STCW and Existing U.S. Licensing Requirements (continued)

SUBJECT

STCW TEXT

EXISTING U.S. REG.

U. S. DEFICIENCY

Regulation 1113

Requires 3 years sea
experience [1] to be
the Officer in Charge
of Navigational Watch
and 1 year as Officer
in Charge of such
watch for a Master's
license (two license
structure) [2]

U. S. requirements for
Operator of
Uninspected Towing
Vessels (one license
structure)

Would require new
license structure and
one year additional
experience to qualify
as Master, Uninspected
Towing Vessel.
Ad d i t ion a 1 tim e
required for Operator
and Motorboat Operator

Requires Master to be
20 years of age.

Master, UTV - 21
Operator UTV - 21
Ocean Operator - 19

One year of age less
One year of age less
One year of age more

Re qui reme nt s
for Master and
Officer in
Charge of
Navigational
Watch of
vessels of less
than 200 GT.
O"l
O"l

[3J

Motorboat Operator -

One year of age more

18 [3J

[1] Appropriate, approved training may be substituted for unspecified amount of sea
service.
[2] In addition, would require Master and Officer in Charge of Navigational Watch to
meet requirements for vessels of between 200 - 1600 GT if not on near-coastal voyage.
[3] The requirements of this regulation may be varied for a class of ships if full
compliance with this regulation is deemed unreasonable or impractical.

APPENDIX 1

Comparison between STCW and Existing U.S. Licensing Requirements (continued)

SUBJECT

STCW TEXT

EXISTING U.S . REG.

U.S. DEFICIENCY

Regulation II/4

Minimum age allowed,

Minimum age alowed for
3rd Mate and 3rd
Assistant Engineer is

Would lower minimum
age 1 year.

Requirements
for Officer in
Charge of
Navigation
Watch, vessels
of more than
200 GT
......
'"

18

19

Requires 3 years sea
experience or
completion of a
training school which
includes at least 1
year sea time

Same except U.S.
Federal and State
Maritime Academies do
no include 1 year sea
time. (State
schoolships include
approx. 6 months sea
time and USMMA about 9
months) .

Would require Federal
and State Maritime
Academies to al ter
their curricula to
include 12 months sea
time or for U.S. to
invoke-Article IX of
the Convention
concerning
equivalents.

Professional Knowledge
Must attend firefighting course
approved by
Administration.

Deck officers must
pass written exam on
fire-fighting
e qui pm en t .

Completion of firefighting course
presently proposed by
U.S. regulations for
"tankerman"
endorsement to license
only. STCW would
require all licensed
officers to attend
such course for this
license.

APPENDIX 1

Comparison between STCW and Existing U.S. Licensing Requirements (continued)

SUBJECT

STCW TEXT

EXISTING U.S. REG.

U.S. DEFICIENCY

Regulation II/5

Must have approved
seagoing service of at
least 1 year during
the preceding 5 year
period; or pass
refresher test; or
complete approved
refresher course.

Must have recent
service within the 3
years before license
renewal; or pass exam
on Rules of the Road.
Any amount of recent
service accepted.

Will require
appl i can ts to show
specified amount of
service.
i.e. At least 1 year
during last 5 years or
pass refresher test or
complete refresher
training.

Must pass physical
examination, including
vision and hearing
tests.

Must pass color sense
test only.

Will require physical
examination, including
visual and hearing
test . Present law
only requires color
sense test. (46 USC
225)

Requires physical
exam, experience and
professional exam to
qualify.

Similar to present
U.S. requirements for
Able Seaman, any
waters - 12 months.

Requires 6 months sea
service vs. 12 months
sea service by present
U.S. requirements .

Re qui reme nt s to
ensure
continued
proficiency for
Masters and
Deck Officers
0'\

co

Regul ation II/6
Requirements
for ratings
forming part of
navigational
wa tch

APPENDIX 1

Comparison between STCW and Existing U.S. Licensing Requirements (continued)

SUBJECT

STCW TEXT

EXISTING U.S. REG.

U.S.DEFICIENCY

Regulation 1II7

Requires an
appropriate and
effective watch be
maintained in port.

None.

Would require the
master to ensure a
proper in port watch
is maintained.

Requires a deck and
engineering watch be
maintained in port.

Up to discretion of
Master.

Will require a deck
and engineering watch
be maintained in port.

Ba sic
principles to
be observed in
keeping a watch
in port.

0'1
\.0

Regulation 1II8
Req ui remen ts
for a wa t chi n
port on ships
carrying
hazardous
cargo.

APPENDIX 1

Comparison between STCW and Existing U.S. Licensing Requirements (continued)

SUBJECT

STCW TEXT

EXISTING U.S. REG.

U.S. DEFICIENCY

Regulation

Must be physically fit
and pass eyesight and
hearing physical.

Must be generally
physically fit to
OCMI's satisfaction.
Eyesight and hearing
not tested.

Will require change in
law to require
physical examinations.
46 USC 225 and 229.

C/E requires 3 years

Requires 3 years EO
experience. 1 year
must be as licensed
liE

Time while holding 2/E
license need not be as
2/E. U.S. regulations
specify 1 year's
licensed service as
2/E. STCW does not
require 36 months as
EO.

Second Engineer must
have not less than 1
year's service as
assistant engineer
officer.

Requires 2 years
service as Engineering
Officer.

Drops 1 year's
required qualification
time.

Must complete firefighting course
approved by
Ad min i s t rat ion.

Must pass written
examination on
firefighting as part
of license
examination.

Will require
completion of
firefighting course
for these 1 icenses.

II I/2

-.J

a

Req ui remen ts
for Chief
Engineer and
Second Engineer
Officer of
vessels of 3000
KW propulsion
or more.

approved sea service
in addition to meeting
requirements for
certification as
engineer officer in
charge of the watch.
12 months shall be as
EO while holding 2/E
license.
.

APPENDIX 1

Comparison between STCW and Existing U.S. Licensing Requirements (continued)

SUBJECT

STCW TEXT

EXISTING U.S. REG.

U.S. DEFICIENCY

Regulation

physical - as above

Physical - as above

Physical - as above

CIE must have not less
than 24 months service

CIE must have not less

Woul d lower
qualification time by
1 year and remove
requirement for 1
year's service as
licensed 2/E.

II 113

Requirements
for Chief
Engineer and
Second Engineer
Officer on
vessels 746 kW
- 3000 kW.
-..I

in addition to meeting
the requirements for
certification as
Engineer Officer of
the watch. 12 months
must be served while
qualified as 2/E.

than 36 months service
as qualified EO.

>-'

2/E must have not less
than 12 months service

2/E must have not less
than 24 months service

as Assistant Engineer
Officer of Engineer
Officer

as qualified EO.

Must complete firefighting course
approved by
Administration.

Must pass written
examination on
firefighting as part
of license
examination.

Would lower
qualification time 1
year

Will require
completion of
firefighting course
for these licenses.

Note: It should be noted that the term "Second Engineer" is defined in STCW as that
position next in line to Chief Engineer. U.S. regulations refer to that person as the
"First Assistant."
In this paper all references to Second Engineer are using the term
as defined in the STCW Convention.

APPENDIX 1
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Comparison between STCW and Existing U.S. Licensing Requirements (continued)

SUBJECT

STCW TEXT

EXI STING U. S. REG.

U. S. DEFICIENCY

Regulation
I II /4

Must be at least 18
years of age.

Must be at least 19
years of age.

Would lower the age
requirement 1 year.

Re qui remen t s
for Engineer
Officers in
charge of a
watch in a
manned or
periodically
unmanned engine
room.

Must have not less
than 3 years approved
education or training,
and an adequate period
of sea service which
may be included in the
3 year period of
approved education or
training.

3 years sea service;
or completion of an
approved training
course; or college
degree in engineering
and partial sea
service.

Period of sea service
required in
conjunction with
approved training or
education up to
discretion of each
Administration.

Must complete firefighting course
approved by
Administration.

Must pass written
examination on
firefighting as part
of license
examination.

Will require
completion of
firefighting course
for these 1 i censes.

APPENDIX 1

Comparison between STCW and Existing U.S. Licensing

Requirem~nts

(continued)

SUBJECT

STCW TEXT

EXISTING U.S. REG.

U.S. DEFICIENCY

Regulation

Must satisfy the
Administration as to
medical fitness.

Must be generally
physically fit (OCMI
discretion)

Would require change
to 46 USC 225 to
require physical
examination for
1 i cense renewa 1 .

Must have approved
seagoing service of at
least 1 year during
the previous 5 years;
or complete refresher
course approved by the
Administration; or
pass a refresher test.

Recency of service is
not required of
Engineer Officers.

Will require recency
of service; or
completion of a
refresher course; or
completion of
refresher test.

Must complete exam or
training in firefighting, first aid,
lifesaving, health
hazards and personal
safety.

Must pass written
examination on
firefighting as part
of exam for QMED
endorsement.

U.S. regulations speak
to the Assistant to
the Engineer Officer
of the watch, not to
the rating below the
Assistant to the
Engineer Officer of
the watch.

II I/5

Requirements to
ensure the
continued
proficiency and
updating of
knowledge for
engineer
officers.
-....J

W

Reg u1 at ion
I I I/6
Re q ui remen ts
for ratings
forming part of
the engine room
wa tc h. *

* This rating is not the Assistant to the Engineer Officer of the watch, but one rating
below 't he Assistant to the Engineer Officer of the watch.

APPENDIX 1

Comparison between STCW and Existing U.S. Licensing Requirements (continued)

SUBJECT

STCW TEXT

EXISTING U.S. REG.

U.S. DEFICIENCY

Regul ation IVIl

Must pass physical
examination,
particularly regarding
eyesight, hearing and
speech.

Physical exam
required, but does not
cover speech.

Physi cal exam wi 11
have to cover speech
a 1 so.

Must pass professional
examination and have
knowledge and
training, including
practical training, in
lifeboats and other
lifesaving equipment,
first aid,
firefighting, etc.

Hold 1st or 2nd Class
FCC Radio-telegraph
license.

Training course will
have to be establ ished
in order to comply
wi th STCW
requirements.

Must pass physical
exam as above.

None.

Will require physical
exam and change in law
regarding license
renewals. (46 USC

Re qui reme n t s
for
certification
of Radio
Officers.

-..J
+:0

Re g u1at ion I V/ 2
Re qui rem ent s to
ensure
continued
proficiency for
Radio Officers

229) •

Must show service as a
Radio Officer with no
single interruption of
service exceeding 5
years; or pass
refresher test; or
complete refresher
course.

None.

Will require recent
service during a 5
year. period;
completion of a
refresher test; or
completion of a
refresher course.

APPENDIX 1

Comparison between STCW and Existing U.S. Licensing Requirements (continued)

SUBJECT

STCW TEXT

EXISTING U.S. REG.

U.S. DEFICIENCY

Regulation IV/3

Must pass physical
exam as above

None.

Will require physical
exam.

Minimum age allowed is

No requirement.

Will require
establ ishment of
minimum age.

Hold 3rd Class FCC
Radiotelephone
license.

Training course will
have to be establ ished
in order to comply
wi th STCW
requiremen t s .

Re qui reme nt s
for
certification
of
Radiotelephone
Operators

-..
en

18.

Must pass professional
examination and have
knowledge and
training, including
practical training, in
lifeboats and other
lifesaving equipment,
first aid,
firefighting, etc.

TABLE X Comparison between STCW and Existing U.S. Licensing Requirements (continued)
SUBJECT

STCW
- -TEXT
-

EXISTING U.S. REG.

U.S. DEFICIENCY

Re g u1at ion V11

All

All

All

Requirements
for training
and
qualification
of Masters,
Officers and
ratings of Oil
Tankers
Regulation V/2
-..J

C"l

Requirements
for training
and
qualification
of Masters,
Officers and
ratings of
Chemical
Tankers
Regul ation V/3
Requirements
for training
and
qualification
of Masters,
Officers and
ratings of
Liquefied Gas
Tankers

All licensed officers

Requires Master, Chief
Mate, Chief Engineer,
Second Engineer,
person in charge of
transfer operation and
ratings assisting in
transfer operation to
complete firefighting
course, tanker
familiarization course
and have experience on
tankers.

on U.S. inspected
vessels are
automatically
qualified as tankerman
by virtue of holding a
license. Unlicensed
ratings qualify for
tankerman endorsement
by written examination
and letter form
employer indication
that they are trained
in and capable of
transferring specific
products.

Would require expanded
training and
experience
requirements for
officers and ratings
serving aboard tank
vessels.

APPENDIX 1

Comparison between STCW and Existing U.S. Licensing Requirements (continued)

SUBJECT

STCW TEXT

EXISTING U.S. REG.

U.S. DEFICIENCY

Regulation VIII

Must pass physical
examination.

None.

Will require
completion of physical
examination and change
to 46 USC 672.

Must have 12 months
sea service; or 9
months sea service and
complete training
course.

Must have 12 - 24
months sea service; or
3 months service and
complete training
course.

Will require 6 months
additional service
form appl i can t
completing training
course.

Must demonstrate by
explanation or by
completion of a
training course the
ability to jump from a
height into water;
board a survival craft
from the water; right
an inverted liferaft
in the water and
launch survival craft
from the ship,
clearing the vessel's
side quickly.

Presently required to
demonstrate ability to
row, use of boat's
sail and launching of
lifeboats plus written
examination on
remaining aspects of
being a lifeboatman.

Will require expansion
of present examination
to cover all subjects
required by STCW.

Re qui reme nt s
for the
issuance of
certificates of
proficiency in
survival craft
-.J
-.J

Source: U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters

APPENDIX 2

Letter from Senator Claiborne Pell.
Chairman. Committee on Foreign Relations.
United States Senate. concerning the
International Convention on Standards of
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping
for Seafarers, 1978
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JAMES P, LUCIER. MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

WASHINGTON ,

DC 20510

May 13, 1987

Mr. Warren Schneeweis
Old Coach Road
Kenyon, Rhode Island 02836
Dear Mr. Schneeweis:
Thank you for contacting my Providence office regarding
the "International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers."
This treaty was signed by President Carter on July 7,
1978, and transmitted to the Senate on September 5, 1979. The
treaty has not been ratified due to concerns raised by Gulf
State Senators about the treaty's impact on off-shore supply
vessels. These concerns are reflected in the Administration,
which has not requested that the Senate give its advice and
consent to the treaty.
I would add that in 1985 the United States Coast Guard
issued interim rules on marine personnel which are basically in
line with the treaty.
It appears as if these rules are
acceptable to all involved, and it is likely that the treaty
will be considered sometime in the near future.
Please note
that I have enclosed copies of both the Coast Guard rules and
the convention itself, as well as some background information
on marine transportation supplied by the Congressional Research
Service.
I hope this information is helpful to you.
Should you
need further assistance or have additional ques tions , please do
not hesitate to contact me.
With every good wish.

L:.?::j::;
Claiborne Pell

Enclosu res
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